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·The problem.of a method of historical analysis played an 
, 
integral 
part in 	the scholarship of Ernst Cassirer~ German,phil~sopher and 
historian .. ' An Essay £!!. 'Man,' the work f~r which he is best known in 
the United States, includes his most lucid discussion of the tasks and 
aims of the historian. The historian must reconstruct the past, in­
fusing it with the immediacy of a living expression.. "Rebirth of the 
past" gives man a better view of his potentialities, a freedom to see 
beyond the demands, characteristics, and contingencies of the moment. 
This view of history and the historian's task.was reiterated 
2 
by Cassirer in several of his works on theory and was implicit in 
a number of his books and articles on historical topics. The follow­
ing critique will focus on Cassirer's discussion of history and on 
his historical method as it'was demonstrated· in several of his writings. 
Despite the criticism of Cassirer's penchant for structure and 
affinity for schemata, he has had a profou~d influence on the general 
community of historians. His work in many areas was unique, and he did 
considerable original research. He has had some influence on sub­
sequent historians, especially with some of the specifics of his data. 
Even the abundance of criticisms of his works attests to the serious­
ness w:tth which he has been viewed as a historian. 
But Cassirer used a paradigm charged with possibilities for 
fallacy. He accepted the idealist.. view that "mind" and "mat tern. are- ...-. 
identical, that "mindH operates according to the rules of logic, and 
that logic can be applied to the history of thought. He used the 
analytic-synthetic idealist approach, the breakdown and recreation 
of a body of data. The history of, thought--the history of the "mindlJ-­
moved from an analytical period to an organic one in a never ending 
process, Cassirer believed. And at. ea~h juncture, at each organic' 
stage, there was a transitional figure to bring everything together 
again: Nicholas of Cusa, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and others. 
Cassirer, in his response to the "crisis" situation, to the plethora 
of fragmented theories of man, to an analytical period in European 
thought, saw himself as a new transitional figure. His paradigm was 
a response to a "crisis" in Kuhn's sense of the word. But at the same 
1 
I 
I 
J 
3 
time, within the framework of Cassirerts scheme, it was intended to 
provide the new synthesis in the development 'of the "modern mind. at , 
Cassirer's synthetic 'paradigm fulfills the criteria Hollinger 
names for "successfulu.works in 'the field. And he must be lauded for 
explaining his methodological position and consistently "abiding' by ..' 
it. But if the basic tenets of i~ealist'Phil~SOPhY are not accepted, 
his entire model fails as a viabl~ parB~igm for historical research ' 
I .' 

and writing. Implicit n the cr~~icisms of Price.Sk~nner. Foucault, . 
and others is the reco of Ithe absurdity of these tenets •. The 
I ' " .... 
pursuit of the histo'ry f the nm~nd,,, of the "knowledge of knowledge, It 
can only lead to historical absutdities. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION THE MODEL 
The p'roblem of a ,method of historical analysis played an integral 
part in the scholarship of Ernst Cassirer, German philosopher-and 
historian. ,'An Essax ~ Man, the work for which he is best known in 
the United States, includes his most lucid discussion of the' tasks and 
aims of the historian: 
The historian must.learn to read and interpret his documents 
and monuments not only as dead remnants of the past but as 
living messages from·it, messages addreSSing us in a language 
of their own ••• It is this tp'alingenes:is,' this rebirth of 
the past, which marks and distinguishes the great historian. 
, There is also a prophecy of_,the past, a revelation ,of its_ 
hidden life" History cannot predict the events to come; it 
can only interpret the,past. But, human life is an organism, 
in which all elements im-ply and exptain each other. Conse­
quently, a new. understanding of the past gives us. at the. same 
time 'a new prosPect of' the future which in' turn becomes an", 
impulse to intellectual and social life. For this double 
view of the world in prospect and retrospect the historian 
must select his point of departure. He cannot find it except 
in his time • • • (in) our present intellectual interests, and 
our present moral and social needs. l " 
The historian must reconstruct ,the past, infusing it with the irnm~-< 
diacy of 'a living expression. URebirth of the vast',' gives man a 
better view of his potentialities, 'a freedom to see beyond the demands,: 
,ch3ract~ristics, and contingencies of the moment. 
This view of history and the historian's task was reiterated by 
Cassire-r in several of his \vorks on theory and was 'implicit in a 
lErnst Cassirer, An Essay ~ }ffin (New York: Bantam, 1970), pp. 

195, 197. 
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number of his books and articles on historical topics. The following 
critique will focus on Cassirer's discussion of history and on his 
historical method as it was demonstrated in several of his writings. 
A few preliminary observations about the necessity for method­
ological commitments in historical analysis, and about the nature of 
these commitments should precede the critique. Every discipline has 
certain aims and methods which are considered indigenous to the dis­
cipline; and any historian follows a method of procedure in his 
analysis of the past, either implicitly or explicitly. In the latter 
case, the historian may make a statement about the method used in the 
analysis; in the former, he may covertly adhere to the method used 
by the community of historians of which he is a part. In order to 
avoid extreme relativity or ~ chaos of narrative generalizations, the 
I, 
I historian must' appropriate 'or develop a ,flexible but rigorous method 
of interpretation and use it conSistently. This methodology, in its 
simplest for.m, may follow a few general rules about the logic of' 
analysis'; or it may, at the other extreme, embody large philosophical' 
principles about the movement of history.
i 
There is only the most general consensus among historians about' 
what history as a discipline is and what its procedures entail. But 
general communities of historians--professional ~istorians and students 
who agree on basic rules for doing history--most ,certainly do exist, 
as they did during Cassirer's lifetime. Any understanding of the
.';1 
I 
works of different historians must be preceded by a' delineation of 
their respective analytical, interpretive methods. These general 
methodological presuppositions can be isolated both in terms of the 
r 
I 
I '''~;'''.i-.'''': .. f 
: 1 • " •~" "'!. ~. • • • 
,3 
community and in terms of the individual historian. 
A recent contribution to the philosophy of science has given 
modern scholars a conceptual framework for carrying o~t this isolation 
of specific methodologies. Thomas S. Kuhn, in his Structures of 
Scientific Revolutions, presents the "paradigm theo'ry, n a conceptual 
contribution of such flexibili,ty in application that it has been' 
adapted and appropriated by some historians. 2 Kuhn uses "paradigmsU' 
to specify eertain accepted methodological examples of n ••• actual 
scientific practice--examples which include'law, theory, application, 
and instrumentation together-~('tl1hich) provide models fro~ which 
spring coherent traditions of scientific researc~.n3 The pperating 
traditions are based on their ability to organize the experiences of 
the specific communities. An accepted tradition gives the commun~ty' 
criteria for distinguishing dif~erent activities" it sets ~riorities 
among these activities, and it gives the community a model around, 
which the community's common activities are arranged. These activ-' 
ities--the community's experience--are contingent on the model that 
organizes them into a common experience.. And in the process of 
"actual scientific practice," in the actual use'of the paradigm, the 
community's experience--the specialized'problems considered by the 
community using the paradigm--is tr~nsformed into something compre­
hensible and"tV'ithin the confines of the specific community, concrete. 
The "paradigm," then, has a social basis, and its function is one of 
2TIlomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Qlicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971). -- , 
3I bid. t p. 10. 
I " 
I 
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org.anization. The community is ~rganized around the paradigm; the 
paradigm is therefore socially grounded. 
Tradit.ions sometimes lose their constituencies, Kuhn continues,. 
and the community either accepts a ne1:-7 paradigm, or it. dissolves, tl1ith 
new communities forming around· new paradigms. These ~'paradigmatic 
Shifts" .are responses to crises situations, in 'tvhich the reigning 
paradigms no longer provide the adequate tools to solve new problems, 
no longer have the common acceptance of the connnunities. l-!ost of 
Kuhn's book is devoted to discussing these shifts, the."structure of 
scientific revolutions." 
In a recent article in the American Historical.Review, .D~vid A. 
Hollinger discusses the application of Kuhn's theory to' history as 
a disciPline. 4 Hollinger recognizes that communities of historians 
with some common consensus of. opinion on the.ai~s and procedures of 
history do exist. They are not as well-defined as scientific communi­
ties:•. , hut;: their ex.istence cannot be disputed. 
')~ong the practitioners of the discipline of history there ~ret 
as ·in other dis~iplines, some commonly held beliefs about the nature 
of the dis~ipline that in turn define the discipline. These beliefs 
constitute a.paradigm. Hollinger lists a number of general.convic­
tions that he believes have a common acceptance among historia~s. In 
order to be deemed "successful," Holli.nger contends, each work of 
" 
scholarship in the fi~ld must assure its professional. readers" • 
" 
that the questions it asks are comprehensible~ and worth asking; that 
4David A. Hollinger, "T .. S.. Kuhnts Theory of Science and its 
Implications for History," American Historical Review, Vol. 78 (1973), 
pp. 370-393. 
• '0' 
5, 
the sources it has examined are indeed the ones most relevant to the 

inquiry;. that its analysis of the sources has been rational." By 

ftrationalU he means tt • • • that the author's pt:esuppos.i tions about 

'human nature, the behavior of groups, causation, etc•. are either shared 
by his readet"s or. are perceived by his peers as respectable,' competitors 
to the views of· the readers. uS. There are many paradigms within this 
greater one, Hollinger argues, such as the Freu?ian, t~e· Narxian, and 
other models of the same" kind. 
Cassirer's methodological views can also be seen as a·paradig­
matie'model.' He was to an extent influenced by the reigning paradigm 
in the community of which he 1->las a part in his 'early' years, ,the' Neo-
Kantian school at the University of aarburg.. By the time he wrote his 
first specific work on intellectual. history, his model had changed 
somewhat, but it was part of another community, one whicn his paradi~ 
defined.. I w"i11 attempt, in the followi,ng critique" to isolat~ 
Cassirer's paradigm and show how he used that paradigm in histo.rical 
analysis. The "crisis" to which he responded~ the 'community to 
'''hieh he belonged, a~d his "philosophy of symbolic .fortnsft-~thc: spring­
board of his historical method--will be sketched. Cassirer's involve­
ment in a community. paradigm will be, established and will be critiqued 
according to commonly held ~ules of historical analysis ~d'procedure~. 
But I intend to concentrate on Cassirer'~ way of-doing history~: ~ the 
model he used to analyze and synthesize specific historical topic$, 
rather than on the characteristics of the paradigm's social base. 
5Ibid., p. 383., 
',. 
" 
'::"'}";;', . ..::.:';. 
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For the purposes of this discussion, I \-1i11 only mention 
Cassirer's epistemological presuppositions. They were, indeed, part 
of his paradigm, but' his methodology as it applied to the historian's 
craft was not necessarily contingent on his epistemology. His writ­
ings on hist9ry co~stituted a real historical achievement in and of 
themseives,'and have been recognize4 as such by both those who criti­
ci,ze and applaud Cassirer.· Further, Cassirer intended h:i,s writings 
on history to be viewed as h,istorica:I wO,rks,. n~t epistemological ones. 
In other "1Ords, the "crisis" si tuation to \·7hich he responded, 
his, academic training and -accomp'lishqtents~' and his uphilosophy of 
-symbolic, forms,tr will be .sk?tched only to establish the validity of-
any effort to critique his model ,as a "paradigm" a.nd to provide a 
guide 't;o t~e, conceptual vocabulary he used ,....hen discussing ,methodology. 
I wiil 'focus on his view of the historian's aims and pro~edures, and 
on his methodology as 'it -""as p-ractic.e:d in- his books and essays on. 
hist.orical topics and developments~" I '{vi11 , att,empt t.o isolate a 
par~digm", a methodologic,al mode~" and will cri~iqu:e it as such .. , 
I 
r 

j 
'. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PROFESSIONAL ACADE'HICIAN: 

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 

Cassirer was a perfect example of the professional academician. 
His long and fruitful life revolved arotmd various a·cademic co.mnuni­
ties, he wrote for an academic a~dience, and his reputation was and 
I 
is an academic one. From l892~ when he, first en~ered the.Uni~~rsit7 
of Berlin, until his death in 1945, 'tvhen' he was' teaching ,at Columbia 
University, he ",Jorked and lived .in a close contatt with academicians 
of different tmiversities. All his 'tvritings. from his book- on Leihniz. '. 
published in 1902,~ to hi.s .11rth ,.2,[ the State, published posthumously, 
were written for professional scholars. His work was of interest only. 
to the academician and the student, and it remains so today. 
His early training was in both philosophy and history. 'He' 
entered the University of Berlin at the age of eighteen and for two " 
years ~-1ent from one school to another, ~nable' to find a course of 
study that satisfied him. In the surJmer of 1894 he took a course' on 
Kant at the University of Berlin. He became interested in.Kantian , 
ph~losophy and those· philosophers involved in its revival in Garman 
academic circles at that time. The teacher of the course on Kant, 
'I Georg Simmel, introduced Cassirel;' to Hermann Cohen's works on Kant. 
Cohen played a pr.imary role in the initial reformulation of 
Kant t s philosophy as it was embraced by the Harburg School of Neo- . 
8 

Kantianism. He rejectad the notion of a noumenal world, the Ding--il;!.­
sleh s tanding behind the phenomenal world,. The categories of reality 
derive from pure thought alone, he contended, independently of sensa 
data. Cohen develo~ed an epistemology much more idealistic tha~ Kant, 
but subm:i.tt~d .it to the same rigoro,us logic. . Consciousness ope,rates 
according ,'to th'e 'laws of logic" Cohen believed.. And because all 
reality exists, within consciousness, then all raality is l~gical. 
Consequen tly, the laws of logic become the la~'Ts of nature. All analy­
sis operates according to the same standards, except that cultural 
and historical analysis' ~ust also deal 1;vith questt"ons' of _value~ -The 
analysis of, value questions also dew~nds a.rigor~us log~cal method. 
Ethical norms have their foundation not in experience, but in the 
structure' of the mind. !listor.ical Weltanschallungen must be app.r~ached 
I' and delineated from the s,tandpoint"of·-absol,ute. ,and universal logic and 
ethics .. 
The only reality similar' to the Din8-~-~ is ideal, Cohen 
. . 
maintained. ,Knowledge of an object ,is .a p,rogressive process.,· History.'. 
'is the endless process by which man, th-;-o'ugh the use of reason, accumu- " " 
lates pure knowledge of both nature and society. The objects of both 
the natural sciences and' the cultut:'al sciences (K~ltuX'Wissenschafter;) 
are known perfectly only at some infinite point in time •. Analysis of 
objects of knowledge, and synthesis of the parts analyzed--the 
." "j:' : - " 
~ ~ .~ . 
.,' 
9 

" f' b ,,6knowledge of phenomena--1.s an unendliche Au-ga e. 
Cassirer l;.;ten t to Marburg and quickly es tablished him.'3e1f as a 
leader among Cohen's group of students. At this time he also studied 
carefully the works of Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz. Mathematics 
and' biology '{.vere two' more areas of special interest to Ca'ss'irer 'dur­
ing this period'. 7 He had taken 'some classes from Dilthey at' t.he' 
University' of Berlin, and. he continued to increase his familiarity 
'With Dilthey's attempts to unify the methods of the cultural sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften) &8 
Cassirerts doctoral dissertation dealt with Des~~rtes' theory 
of knowledge~ a~d he used it for 'the ,first section in 'an ext~nsive 
j' 
study of Leibniz published in 1902 {Leibniz' System in seinen 
,,6Dimi~.ry Ga",.1ronskYJ UErns,t Cassirer: His L~fe and His Work,." itt 
~ PhilosophZ of Ernst' C'assi'rer'~ ·"'~d. Pau'i Schil1'p, (r1enasha, Wisconsin: 
Ceorge Banta Publishing Co., 1949), p. -9. Also. see Georg C." Iggers t, 
The German Conception of History' (Middleton, Connecticut, Wesleyan Uni­
versity Press, 1968), 1'1'. 144-147; and Ernst Ca~sirer, uHerman Cohen,n 
Social ,Research, Vol. 10 (1943), pp. 219-~32. 
7Gawronsky, pp. '6, 8. 
8There ha~ been ~~nsiderabie debate over the translation of this 
term. The most commonly accepted translations are "cultural sciences,U , 
or "humanities .. " For an explanation of the concept of Geistes~vissen­
schaften arid of Diltheyts philosophy, see H. A. Hodges~ The Philoso2hy 
of Wilhelm Dilthey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952); Rajo 
Holborn, rtWilhelm Dilthey and the Critique of Historical Reason:' in 
European Intellectual Histo!y Since Darwin and Marx. ed. ~-1. Warren 
Wagar (New York: Harper and ROW, 1966), pp. 56-88; Igg~rs, pp. 133­
144; For a comparison of the Neo-Kantians t Kulturwissenschaften and' 
Dilthey's r~isteswissenschaften, see Rudolf-Hakkreel, n~-1ilhelm Dilthey 
I 
I and the Neo-Kantians: The Distinction of the Gei.stest.,issenschaften and 
the Kulturtvissenschaf ten," Journal of the His tory of Philosophy It Vol. 
7 (1969), pp. 423-440. 
i, 
..
/­
~ ~
·1 
,. :~ ~' .....,.- .. ~ " ~ '\ 
; 't f "" ... ' 
10 • • ~ "". 4 
wissenschaft1ichen'Crundlagen).9 In. 1904 and 1906 respectively he 
edited and publishe.d two volumes of Leibniz',s writings. 
While doiug research on Leibniz he began working on a probiem, 
that was later to grow into the three-volume Das>Erkenntisproblem~ 
der Philosophie und Wissenschaft' der neueren: Zeit (1906,,' 1907, ~Q 
.. 
1920 respectively)'. He attempted to give a, comprehensive, pictut:'e of· , . 
the development of epistemology in philosophy 
, 
and science from 
,-
the " 
'Renaissance to the present. These three volumes were not historical 
works. but dealt with purely epistemological problems in their his­
torical' developme~t,. The works are of' a Neo-Kantian orientation in 
that their focus was on philQsophers 'and on epistemological problems ' 
of interest to ,the Neo-Kantian. 10 ~funy of the problems and thinkers 
he ',considered in these ~olumes'-were re:considereci in ilis', later his~'''··· ._. 
, . 
~orical wor~s, but for dif~ere~t 'reasons. His reputati"on as a ~~icholar 
. ' 
, " ' " " '·11 
was established with the publication of the first two volumes.' 

Cassirer continued to write and publish, and in 1910 his' 
 I 
.1 
I 
Substanzbegriff und, Funktionsbegriff appeared.. It was, devot'ed to the 

problem'of concepts, the' logic of concepts, and the process: and .func­

tion of ~onc~ptual knOwledge;~2' S~bstartce and Ftmction~ as 'the work 

" ' 
appeared in 'English',' gave' Cassirer an international, repu~a'tion•. Tt, .; 
9Cf. R.' Klibansky and W. Solmitz, "Bibliography of Ernst 

Cassirer's Writings," Philosophy and 'History: Essays Presented to' 

Ernst Cassire~. eds. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (New York: 

Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 338-353. 

10Gawronsky, p. 9. 
IIA fourth volume was finished in, 1933 and was ,pUblished, 

posthumously' (1946). 

12Gawronsky, p. 18. 

. .... , 
.,~~ .:.. '\., ~~". .'O' 
• ~_ i'~'. ' !. :.:: .,~'"
• H ~t 
11 
was trCh'lslated into a number of foreign languages. This ~vork also 
led to Cassirer's split '\vith Cohen over some of t;he specifics of the 
. 13 
concept theory. 
In the next decade Cassirer wrote a number of epistemological 

essays and edited several, of Kant's and Leibniz's ,:vritings. The 

\-101''k upon which his reputation as a philosophar is based was pub­
lished in 1923, volume one of Ppilosophie dar Symbolischen Formen 

(Die Sprache). A second volume followed in 1925 (~mythische 

Denkan), and a third in 1929 (P~anomenolo8ie de~ Erkenntnis). 

. . . 
Cassirer's interests· continued to revolve ·.around problems· relevant 
',to. the. Heo-K.antian academic, comfnun-ity.,- 'but the scope of his analyses' 
was ~·onsiderably. broadened. The' "philosophy of symbolic 'fonns" 
represented a un~que contribution o~ his part~ and ·its aim represented 
the broadened scope of his intere'sts and analyses .. : In thes~. volumes 
,'. 
.., .. 
in turn, is a prod~ct of aU'endless series of cognitive, s~bolic 
activit-ies. The thre.e-vo'lume .Philosophy of Symboli~. 'Forms purported 
to analyze 'the .structure of these activities, focusing on special 
.. categories 0f ·"symbolic ·forms"· underlying' d1ffe-rent .realms' of human 
activity: religion~ art, language, myth, and science. 
t· 'By thIs' time. -Cassi'rer"had gone beyond .the Neo-Kantia.."1is·m. of -hisI 
Harburg period, and had created an ep'istemology of consIderable- . 
. i 1· II.. or~g 1'la l.ty•. l1i5 'concern for' the historical genesis of 'cultural 
13Ib·d . 
__1._., p. 21 •. 
14Cf.; "~villiam H. lverkmeister, uCassire"r's .Advance Beyond Neo~ 
Kantianism,n in ~ I}hilosophy of Ernst Cassirer, e.d. Paul Schilpp,. 
"pp. 757-798. 
, ­
~ l' ... 
- --
. '.12 ­
forms is documented by the framework he ,used for the examination and 

presentation of the Itphilosophy of symbolic forms. t. This philosophy,

. -.
as will be shown· later, necessitated a historical perspective.: ._ Arid· 
his research into. problem~ of the h~story of philosophy and the 
. history of ideas ,bor~ fruit in, a number of historical ~onographs and. " 
essays written arid. published during this p,eriod. Individuum und Kosmos 
. -----­
..!!! i!!!. Philosophie ~ Renaissance appeared in 1927...' In 1932' Die·: .. 
. . 
Platonische Renaissance .!..!!. England unci die Schule. ~ Cambridg~, P..!.:: .. 

Philosophie der Aufkl~rung, and DaB Problem J ..~ Rous~eau~ followe-d. 

Cassirer, a Jew, did not wait to be dismissed from his 'post a$ 

rector qf the Un~versity of H~l:nl'rg, when Hitler: bee,arne' Chancellor in 

1933. He 'left Germany, going to Oxford, where.he lectured for two 

there for. ~.ix years,. In 1941 ~e acc~p~ed' an ·invitation from -Yale 
University and came to the United States as a v~siting, p~ofessor~ He 

had originally intended to'remain for two years. only and then return 

. to Sweden, but the entrance- of the Uni~ed. States into. the War· changed 

his plans. He continued te~c~ing at. Y.ale, urtti;t t~e s~,~r of 1~44t ' 

"i-1hen he accepted. an invitatiQri t.o teach at ..Co.J;umbia. Uni.v.e1:sity. :­
While Cassirer' tias..in . the United: States ..he. wrote. a ·.number. of .' 
articles of some historical import, inc~uding, ~'Giovan~i Pica della. 
1A...irandola" (1942), !'Galil~o.:· A New Science -and a. New Sp.j.ritl1 (19.42), 
"Some Remarks on the Originality of the ,R.e~aiSSaIlc.e" (19.43) t -uThe 
Pla~e of Vesa1ius in the Culture of the Rena:issanceu' (1943) t "Nelvt.on 
and Leibniz" '(1943), !lousseau, Kant, Goethe (published posthumously, 
1946)" and "Galileo's Platonism" (published posthumously, 1946). He 
-

13 
continued 'tvriting on epistemological problems during this time, but 
his orientation shifted more tmvards analysis of culture and the 
state. IS Both ~ Logj.k der Kultul\-1issenschaften. (1942) and ,An Ess,ay 
.2!!. Man, the work forl.".vhich Cassirer is probably best known in America,n 
academic circles, ~la9 published just a few months before his death on 
April 13, 1945. 
15F. S. C. Northrop, "'Obituary: Ernst Cassirer," The Philosophical' 
Review» Vol. 55 (1946), p. 451. 
I' 
• 'I ;. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE "CRISIS" Al'iD THE RESPONSE: THE PHILOSOPHY . 

OF SYHBOLIC FOR..'1.S 

A 'philosophy of symbolic forms' can' ~~ke good the claim of 
uni ty and un!versalfty, which metaphysics in its dogmat.ic 
form must abandon. Not only can ·it unite these various modes 
and directions of our knowledge of the, world; oyer an~ aQove, 
this, it is capable of evalu&ting every attempt at understand­
ing the 'tl1orld, every analysis of ~t tvhich the human is capable 
of, and conceiving each in its true character. It is in this 
manner that the problem of objectivity first becomes vis-ible 
in .i,. ts full scope; 'and taken in this se~se it encompasses not 
.on.~y', the ,C'osttlOS of t\atur~ ,but also that of cultut'e. 16 , 
Cassirer made the above claim for his "philosophy of symbolic fOnDs'" 
in a"number of his writings.'· It provides the uclue ~f Ariadne," he 
believed, leading 'out of the "labyrinth" of modern philosophy.l7 
Like many of 'his contemporari~s,: Ca~sirer felt there 'to be'a "crisis'" 
in European philosophy, that 'a plethora of' theories ,,,ith little comon 
ground made the umodern theory: of. manti a col1~ction of fragm~~ts,.. 
'This "theory" had.lost its, intellectual.t~centertU, C.as~i~far cO'nt(!nded. 
'and tlEach theory becomes a Procrustian bed on .\vhlch the, empirical 
18facts a·re stretched, to. fit, a precon-ceived. pattern. n tfu.ile. he did 
not dtvell on. the nature .'of th~ "c,risis" si.~uationtp.e saw' it as a . 
pervasive problem" in his era. And his recognition of this situation 
15Ernst Cassirer. 1egic of ~~anities,. trans. Clarence Smith 
Hmve (New Haven: Yale University Pre.ss, 1963)t p. 67. 
17A..'l Essay ~ Han, .p .. 24. < 
18Tbid ., p .. 23. 
---'­
\'. 
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served as a departure point and justification~ he believed, for his 
"philosophy of symbolic forms." 
Cassirer \Vas not alone, in recognizing a "crisis" situation in, 
'European culture at that time. 'Some of the labels used by historians. 
to characterize the period-~lIcultural desp~~r, ..19, udissolving certain­
ties, ..20 "the re:volt against positivismn21_-attest to a general feeling 
of uncertainty and· -insecurity,. In .general 9' intellectual life at the 
,t':lrn ~f the c,entury saw a grmving awareness" by social ph.ilosophers and 
commentators, historians, and ar'tists of the limitations of human 
knowledge ,and the suhjectiv,e cha):'aeter', ,?f, the'. cognitive process., ,The 
positivi.$ts still .as,sumed. the universe to be, an integrated system 
governed by ·the laws of mathematics" ' They assumed· the structure of' 
both physical and social reality to be disce~ible through the methods 
of 'the natural sciences. 
During this period the pes'itivis'ts' arid' their view of the world 
came under increasing attack.. Friedrich Nietzsche, t.Jilhelm Dilthey~ 
.1Henri Bergson, Sigmun~ ~re~dt. Bene4e~to Croce" Ma~ \~eber--these were 	 , 
~ .a fet.r of the thi;n~ers ~ho .questioned:' the v.~lidity of the, posi~iVi.st '. . .. ' 
claim for scientific objectlvity iIi social analysis~: .Historians and.. .' 
social scientists no longer concentrated on the problem of what 
19pritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair {New York: 
,Doubleday and Co., ·196f)"~ .. 
2fJr.eorge L. Hosse, The .ctllt~re. of Western Europe: The Nineteenth 
\ . and Tt...entieth Centuri'~s (New York: Rand Hc.Nally, 1961), "P"P7 277-292.I 
j 
I 	
. 2iB• Stua~t Hughes, Consciousness and Society: . The Reorientation 
. of European !'.E..cial .!!}ought,1890-l930 (New York: Vantage-, 1958)., 
"'. ~: 
> •••• ..~ ~ .. I • 
~, ". 
' .. :~- ::,. ,,'~:/'}: .. , 
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constituted society or history; instead. they asked hO'V1 a sciencEl. of 
history or society \Y'as possible and, if so, hm·r it m.ight be constructed. 
Philosophers no longer searched for ultimate truth within a rnetaphysi­
cal framework, 'but attempted to answer questions of the epistemology 
and logic of historical thought 'and to do cemparatlve and historical 
studies of different philosophies and ideas .. 
The "revolt against positivism/' however. did not reject all. 

'the tenets of positiv·ism. DiltheY"\~eber, Freud, and others'all 

/

shared the positivis~ regard for the empirical fact. They wanted to 

. .. 
· eliminate' all 'speculative basis for 'modern . thought t . but they 'ret~ined 
, a' strong faith· in scientific' method. as. 'a me'ans 'for: gaining" knm,,1edge 
----~___ ~_....___10 • 
. . 
· of reality. They did not belie.ve," however, 'that all meaningful activ­
ity tvas rational., as the pOSitivists did. They had- a ~·trong faith 
in .the cognitive process and in logic as vehicles ·for finding mean­
tional, the· passionate. nilthey's Erlebni~,. Bergso~'s.elan vital,
----­ ----­
Freud's ·concept of ~he id; for· example, a.11 represent~d an: effort ·to 
find rational categories and. explanat~ons for the ii-rational. 22.' 
Implicit, also,' was a belief in history 'as a ·meaningful process.· 
History and change was process, these thinkers 'believed, and-was 
· therefore' discerna'ble by· rational analysis. Irrationality does not 
defy analysis, but is part of a proc~ss that C8..L'1 be .discovered by 
" 
• I 
; , 
i 
· scientific interpretation of phenomenal data. 
22Cf.. \-]j.lls.on H.. Coates and Hayden V. ,rnite, The Ordeal of Liberal 
Humanism' (Ne'to" York: HcGraw-Hill~ 1970). Vol .. 2, pp:2"S6"'1'262,. TI'l1-284 .. 
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The essent'ial characteristic, of the "crisis" period in European 
thought, then, consisted in the revolt against positivism, against 
the belief in the rational systematic nature of all physical and 
social processes. ' The validity of scientific method' as a tool for 
knowing reality '!,.las not rejected~ nor ,wa~, the belief in the'validity 
of the empirical fact. A systematic, IQgicql ~~th9d ~as used by these' 
thinkers to delve into the realm of t'he irration'al, to ,rationally 
understan4 subjectivity and irrationality. 
Cassirer ,followed his 'contemporaries 'in loo~ing for a synt~etic 
method for analyzing reality. H~ had a,profound belief in the value. 
of the phenomenal fact and·: the' s.cientific l1!ethod" ,coupled with a rejec- , 
tion of any speculative' explanation of reality. 'He saw the essential 
natl.ire of the "crisis" in Europe-an philosophy ,to be a 'COltflict ~.e'Cween· 
empiricists and idealists, between positivists and metaphysicians,. 
'between rational ideation and'phenomenological experience: 
\-That would seem to c~nstitute: the bias of ,'empiricism' as "(yeil 
as abstract 'idealism', is precisely that, neither of them f~lly 
. and clearly develops thi's fundamen,tal, relation. One' posits a 
concept of the given particular but fails to recogn~ze that 
any such concept must always, explicitly or implicitly, encom­
pass the d~fining attribute~ of some universal; the pther 
asserts the necessity and validity' of these attributes out " 
fails to designate the medium through which they can be reore­
s.;;n ted in the g1yen psychological world of censciousness. 2~' , 
"Idealismtt refuses to recognize the .empirical,. phenomenolog'ical basis 

of'reality: uempiricismt • fails to explain hOly empix:.ical reality is 

cogitated in' the "world o'f consciousness. II 

2 3Erns t Cassi rer, P!liloso~hy of Symbolic Forms: Language, trans. 
R.. Hanheim (Nety', Haven: Yale Dnive,rsity Press, ,1953), p,. 110. 
. '. ~ 
J' : .~ . 
~ :,~~:"~ ,<" ,n."<: ",~ ~ 
I It" t( :-; 
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"If, ho.. ..rever, n Cassirer continued, "tole start not with 'abstract 
postulates but from the concrete ~asic form of spiritual life, this 
dualistic antithesis is resolved.. The 'illusion of an original di.vision 
bet\,zeeI\ the intelligible and the sensuous, ·the t idea' an.d 'phenomenon' 
vanishes."24 The "concrete basis for spiritual l~fe,n Cassirer con­
tended, is found in the symbolic function, in the epistemologic.al 
process described by the "philosophy of ~ymbolic forms." 
Cas:3irer saw h~s depar~4r~ point, then, in the recogniti.on of 
the "crisis" situation in Europclan p~ilosophy, and his mission in the ·1 
eXP'9'sitiq,n o,e a neVI .ucenter,". o.ne that would provide a Hconceptual 
.unit.Yt.~. to .the. anarchy..of cul~ural..and sC.ie.ntific. data .. 2S His, "phi.':" 
losophy of symbolic forms" '-las in~ended to provide that "unity. U 'The· 
main t~nets o~ Gassirer~s phil,osoph;i.cat system will be presented, 
belotol. 
********** 
s~one o~ hi~ .1~1:l:j.los<?'phy; ..i~ th.e belief in ~he exi.E!tence· of a UIl.iye'l;,sal. 
cultural forms~ only chat of logic,. the concept, cognition, s~ems to 
. . 0,26
enjoy a true' a~d .aut1:tet:tt~c. aueono.my.... ',' The mos.t significant c~nt.ri~ 
button tn the histpry ··of philosophy came from the Gr.eeks., Cassirer 
,,' 24i!lid .. , pp.• I1D-1.11 • 

.. 

25Essay, p. 24. 

26Philosophy of Symbolic "Forms: LanBuage, p. '63.. 
.' . ..' ~ . 
.. •.•.i. ~ • 
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of concepts of the nature of man, seeing the crucial change coming with 
the acceptance of the Copernican system by philosophers and scientists. 
}fontaigne's words--nthat man alone is able to value things according 
',to their true estimate and 'grandeurH--are taken by Cassirer as a 
• .. • clue to the whole subsequent development of the modern 
theory of man. Hadem 'philosophy and modern science has had 
to accept the challenge contained in these words. They had 
to prove that the new cosmology, far from enfeebling or 
r 	 obstrut,ting the po'(~er of ,human "reason;' established ~nd con­
31firms this power. . 

Such has been the aim of philosophy, he believed, and such 'o1as th~ 

stated aim of his own thinking. 

The uc;risis" of modern philosophy '(-las the condition, cognitive 
philosophy was the means" and self-knot;ledg.e t.;as the aim of Cassirer t s 
mission, his search for the "clue of Ariadne." This clue, he believed, 
could be fmmd in the symbolic function. The primary characteristic 
of the human world distinguishing it from the animal \Jorld is man,' s 
abil~~y to symbolize, experience in art, religion, myth, h~story, and 
science. ',Between the tt1-e-ceptor, systemn , and· the "effector, systemU-'­
bettveen the stimulus effectiori and th~ response articulation-lies 
, I.. '" 
.. .. 
the "symoolic system. ,,32 It is an artificial medium, Sf~ symbolic net II 
• f h .' u33 ,.,.. b hi·t he t.'1ng1 d e 'tIeD 0 uman exper1ence. .LD e sure, t. e cogn tl.ve 
faculty' ,is possessed by all "humans, but it is an inadequate term, 
Cassire:r helieved, to express the symbolizing function of ,D'.an. Instead 
of being defined as an, "animal ,rationale," he should be defined as 
311b;d
---=-..•. , p. 16 .. 

32~.,. p .. 26. 

3Jlbid., p. 27 .. 

I 
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an "animal symbOlic.um. u34 .An analysis of this function~ then:. pro­
vides a path out of the "labyrinth" and provides a conceptual unity 
for understanding both culture and 'science, Cassirer argued. 
The beginning point for such an analysis~ for' delineating the 
symbglic functio~, come's wi'th a definition of spee~h: nAIl culture 
fornts are 'active e:;-tpr,~ssion forms.,,,35 "Emotional language" and 
"propositional'language" are the two types of language found in the 
\11 1 h . • l' ,,36Horganic •.;orld. h an~uage as a certa~n emotlona' t1nge, but 
nemotional language" proper beldngs, to the an~l:1a~, "-To.-rld <1n4" as 
Cassirer sometimes called it, the "primitive '.;'Qrld. if Nan gives 
expression a' theoretical 'form, he objectifies experience of, ph-enOlnena 
tlll:o~gh :langu~g~, he symbolizes: ,...... the, a+1ima). p,qs;;esses, a 
pract:,:i,.,Sl,a;t imagi~iation and i'!.Jtelligence whereas man alone has developed 
, , ,,>,~}::~~;;::; " ' .'. •' . ... 37 
a ne~l' .,:f-qno: a symDol~c imag~nat~o!~ and' inte11.l.,genC.f! to It 
,Cassiret:, retold the story of Helen Keller's development of 
" .. . 38 ..,'
ve:rbal skills', 'as an .. illustration of _t.his,:tene,t~ ',The day" sh,e ,:learned 
every: thing has, a name IJ and thB. t 'the manual alphabe t is the key to 
under~tanding trese names, she began to see relations, to abstract 
.. , r. . . . . '. " 
func.tion., to s}"mbolize: "It had to be 'unders,tood. that everythina ~ 
~~--that the symbolic function is not restricted to particular 
35Logic o~ ,the Humanitie~" p. 10. 
36Essay; p. 31. 
,,371, "d ~.t p.' 36 .. 

38Ibid•• pp .. 36-39. 

...J. , 
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cases but is a principle of universal applicability which encompasses' 
the whole field of human thought. n39 "Propositional expression" 
concentrates not on the content of language-':"the substance of language-­
but on tne process, the function of language. Only'in the function of 
theoretical language can we discover ,a universal principle•. Substance 
varies from language to language, even lvithin anyone language; but 
the symbolic function is. the same for all. All human languages demon- " 
strate the propositional, the theoretical, the symbolic ,form of human· 
experi.ence • 
. those relations in the abstract t is aiso dep~ndentt> is a part of:t 
symbolic thought. All relatio~al t1\ought,. .all reflective thought., is 
contingent on the symbolic process. It frees man from a life ft 
confined 't~i thin the limi ts of biological needs. and practical interests. U 
It gives man ". acces~ .t~ the 'ideal H~rldt which is opened . . .. 
, " ,,40 

from different sides by reiigion, art, philosophy, science. ~t 

'An.. es·sential.. ,~acet ,of ,t~.i~. symbo~~c.: process, Cassirer argued. is'.' . 'i I 
I 
..the unique human I vic'to1. of time. and' space, ",indeed ~," the type of t"iine 
- . 
and space man operates in. The 1m"est stratum. of time and space is 
"organic. u41 Animals follow ins'tinct ,and "bodily itnpulses,,42 in 
39 Ibid·• , p. 40. 
40Ibid .) p •. 45. 
( . 
4" .' . 
"'"Ibid .. , p. 26, 

42Ibid. ,,' p .. 4i.. 

I. 
." _,' . I 
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their experience, without any semblance of any ideational processes. 
Man also acts within this realm of "organic space," but he' works in 
another, higher, stratum when he begi~s to ideate, to symbolize. He 
begins to work within an" abstract of u s ymbolic t1 space. 43 Like the 
space of geometry, it is a .- • homogeneous, universal space: it:II • 
was only in ,the medium of this new and characteristic form of space 
that man could arrive" at the concept of unique, systematic, cosmiS 
order. ,,44 In this space appearances are not merely handled, they are, 
; 
represented and their relations ,considered. , 
time. "Organic" time is' a process, a stream of events, where past-,. 

present~ and.~uture are joined in a constant movement. In the animal 

"world, experience is a part of that movement, and time is never 
abstracted. Universal time" the time of human culture, is to be fQ,und. 
in the human ability to remember. ,_ In memory, Cassirer asserted, 
.' former 'impr~ssion~- are llriot only repeate~, b.ut must ,also be ordered 
and 'lcica~ed'; ·and referred .to different poi~ta, of t~me ..fl45 " 'In order 
to do this, time-,must, be cons"idered· as a general. scl)eme, as a "serial 
order'. 1146 In' the ideational- process man arranges events in sequential 
orders within comprehensive schemes. And it is not the facts, the 
contents -of, these', memories, 'that give the. scheme its ooiversal meaning. 
43Ibtd• , p. 48. 

44Ibid • , p. 50. 

45Ibid. , p. 56. 

46 Ibid• , p .. ·57.

,,-­
, . 
• , 'j.,-' ; 
It is, once again, the conceptual' fO~t the functions of the contents 
that demonstrate the tmiversality-, and meaning of the scheme':' "The 
'integral' of consciousness is constructed not from the sum' of its, 
Sensuous elements (a,b,e,d" ••• ,), but from tJ:te totality" as it 
were, or its differentials of relation and form (drl" drZ' ,dr3 , ••• )~47 
Meaning is not de_rive~ from the contents--the usensuous elementstt.:..­
of the serial order in memo'ry(Uconsciousnesst1) ~ b~t: frpm the relations 
and ftmctions of. those contents. Past expe.rienc.e ,is, ~ot, just repeated, 
~n .memory, .it is reconstructed; and.this reconstruction process is a 
.tl'Q. i y~:rs~l .. ,chara.cte.ris.tic .. C?~.' 'fi1a~!, ...It·. i~... ~ $y~bo.~i:c~ .pr~~ess t .. ~.ti~iz.iri~ 
the phenomena of ..the past .. ,.. The poetic' imagination and historic.al 
inquiry both play ·a part in this recollection ·proce~s. 
Cassire'r' 'did. not exclusi:vel:y: concentrate on the relation 
pr~sen t to"..the. PAS.t;,. howeye~ ~ . H~ also defined what he called "the 
dimension of the future.n4~ He identified the existence'of a:. 
"theoretical idea of the future,/' one that .is a prerequisite for .all 
19 ' 
cultural· activities. ~ . It ·is, essentl.ally, the "symbolic .future,." 
the' capacity of man to- forn:tulate ideals or symbols of his fut'ure.· In 
this sphere lies man 11 s· ·essential .freedom, the .frE7edom .to conceptualize 
utopias. to forsee, to prophesy, to plan the. future •. Symbolization of·. 
the future make~ tt. • • 'room f.or- th~ possiq~e· as oppqsed to .passi-ve . 
aC<Juiescence in the present state Qf affairs. It is symbolic thought .. 
47philosophy o~ Symbolic' Forms: Language, p. 105. 

48Es'say, p. 58. 

49 Ibid., p. 60. 

: I' ,,, 
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which overcomes the natural inertia of rnan and endmvs him \yith a new 
ability, the ability constantly to reshape his human universe. usa 
Hith universality and "conceptual unity" as criteria, Cassirer 
elevated, 'proce;;;s ,over co:nte~t. fu~ction ove,r s~bst~nce. The ,fQrIJu.:~r 
precludes the latter. Only in function can man find universality, 
a "conceptual unity" that encompasses u • ••not only the cosmos of 
nature but also that of culture." Cassirar maintained the only valid 
51 a~aly~is of culture must limit its scope to man'stwork. H ,It must 
concentrate on the cr~ative pro¢ess, the creative function. 
It ,is this' 'Work, i~ is the system'of human activities, which 
'd'efines' and determirie$ the circle of' 'humanit:y~" Language, 
myth~ religion, art, science, history are the constituents. 
the various .sectors, of th;i.s c;::.i t;'cle ~ A t philoSQphy of man t , , 
would therefore be, a philosophy ~lh.ich ,would give us insight 
i~to the f~d~ental s,tructure of each of these human activ-' 
itles .. and '{.·lhich at the ,same time Hould -enable us to under­
stand them as an 'organic ~.Jhole •• 52 
The "philosophy of symbolic forms," then, revolves arotmd a 
method in which function, the elicieed need for conceptual Unity~ the 
poetic imagination, and rational analysis ?lay major roles.' Cassirer 
. , 
used much of the conceptual vocabulary of the "philosophy of Sy'"mbolic 
I 
forms" when discussing his method 'of doing history, as will be seen 
in the following chapter. 
, . 	
50Ib1d., p. 68 .. 
51Ibid .. , p. 7l t .. 
·52Ibid., p,. 74 .. 
" 
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CHAPTER IV 
SYHBOLIC RECONSTRUCTION, FUNC!I"ON," lu'iD STRUCTURE:' 

THE PARADIGU 

It might be possible to maintai'n that Cassirer's vie'to:: of hi$tory' 
merely an extension of his epistomelogical views,. of his t~philosophy 
of symbolic forms." But to do so would b,e to neglect Cas~irer Isreal 
histori.cal achievement. It is possible to analyze his- methodological 
par~dignr, concentratin'g' on h~w' it i~' u~ed"in 'his hist.orical works,; 
\vithout extensively considering his' apistemological disposit,ions. 
The former cha.pter ,'(<las included only to f.amiliarize the ,reader with, 
some of the terminology and conc~pts, Cassirer uses ,in disc~ssing 'his, 
method of doing history and, to demons.trate that ,Cassirer did make a 
UresponsaU" to ,the "crisis" s'it'uation in, European philosophy;. " Cassirer 
did believe ,a structural orientation is, necessary for any histo~ical :j 
I 
Ianalysis and'synthesis': "History itself, 'Would be lost in the bound- \ 
less mass of disconnected facts if it did not have a general structural 
scheme by means of 't-1hich it can classify 11 order" and orga.nize· these 
facts." 53 But a full comprehension of his l1philosophy of symbolic 
formstJ is not necessary'for understanding his .particular structural 
! , orientation, for understanding the .paradigm he used for dOing history. 
It might also be possible to maintain that Cassirer was. not.a 
,h.istorian of ideas,.but a historian of.philosop'hy~ using the criteria 
53Ibid., p. 75--76. 
.. ~~~... f" 
. ::.: /~/:~S: ,./,
, " .... ' '.' 
Paul Kristeller uses to delineate the t'<10 realms. In an article in 
the .~ournal £!.. the History of Philosophy, Kris teller desc~ibes commonly 
I. 
accepted definitions of the two closely related e.ndeavors," the history 
of ideas and the history of philosophy. ,The historian of ,philosophy, 
Kristeller maintains, concentrates on the relations of a given phil­
o50phical idea or problem t1. • .... to the .. context of the philosopher 
~Jho expresses it, and to that of his contemporaries, ~redecessors, and 
successors in the history of phi~osophy" Ii A historian of ideas includes 
ideas from the discipline of philosophy as objects of study" but he 
also '(-larks ~-1i. th i~eas from art I Ii t~rat,'..1re. the s,cien~es, and reli­
giou, n .... ~'lithin the context' of the ..... thought \vith which they 
may be more or: less con~ected_tf54' The historian, of 'philosophy is'con­
cenled with problems of philosa-phr, their developm~nt and philos9phical .--­
, , 
backg-round, ,~hile the historian of .ideas deals ~l7ith. the p1:oblems of 
science, art t literature 7 religions, as w~ll as philosophy_ 
Cassirer claimed philosophy and the history of philosophy as his 
.r~alms of 'operation. But he gave a special and quit.e broad definition' 
to philosophy_ Philosophy should focus on defining the nature of man, 
Cassirer maintained. It should center on a delineation of the limita­
t~ons as well as the potentialities of cultural life. Philosophy pro-· 
vides the milieu in ~.,hich culture f.ormulates .i ts', ~de:as and principles'. 
Ca5si~er's state!:lent of purpose in the preface to the Philosophy E!. 
th~ ,Enlightenment best summarized his, vie~v of philosophy. 
54Paul Kristeller, "The History of ~hilosophy and the History 

of Ideas," Journal 'of the ,History of Phl1oS0!lhy, Vol .. 2 (1964), p.' 13~ 
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Such a presentation of philosophical doctrines and systems 
endeavors as it were to give a 'phenomenology of the phil­
osophic spirit'; it is an attempt to shotv how this spirit, 
struggling 'Ii'ith purely objective problems, achieves clarity 
and depth in its understanding of its mm natur~ and destiny, 
and of its own fundamental cha-racter 'and mission •• ,. Phi­
'losophy, accorq.ing to this interpretation, is no special field 
of knowledge'situated beside or above the principles of natural' 
science, of law and governrnent, etc., but 'rather the a1l­
comprehensive medium in ,which such principles are formulated, 
developed and formed. Philosophy is no longer to be separated 
from science~ history, jurisprudence, and politics; it is rather 
to be, tha atmosphe're in 'tvhich they c'an exist and be effective. 
Philosophy is no longer the isolated substance of the intellect; 
it presents the totality of the intellect in its true function. 
in the specific character of;" it.s investigations and inquiries',. 
its methods and essential cognitive 'process. 5S 
,Cassit"er gave ,philosophy a special itnportance, one that '{vas closely 
tied to his assertion of' ·the need for a structural orientation' in' 
app'roach~ng historical facts. In liis 'tvrltings, the history of phi-' 
losophy is the history of ideas. It includes any ideas and cultural 
,~xp't'essions 'inat might be a part· of the uall-comp'r..ehensive rnediuml~ 
in which science, history, jurisprudence, and politi~s'exist'and 
operate. tolith this in miqd, an examination of Casslrer,'s sy~tetna~ic 
method, his' "symbolic reconstruction'" paradigm, can be examined. 
********** 
, The beginning point in any analysis' 'of .Cassirer's method' lies 
in a consideration of '\;<lhat he believed constitutes 'a hi'storical nfact~ n 
Historical Ufacts lt obviously, do not' have a material 'or physical exist­
ence and meaning, and any historical "facet can be understood only 
55Ernst Cassirer" ~ .Philosophy.of the Enligh tenment:t trans. 
Frit~ C. A. Koeiin and 'James P. ~ett.ygro'\1e (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1965), pp. vi·..vil.. 
'f 
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through analysis of that meaning. He therefore emphasized "monuments" 
as the first' index of historical "facts": 
t-Tha't is actually preserved for us from the past are spe~ific 
historical monuments: 'monuments' in word and writing. in 
picture and bronze. Th'is first becomes his tory for, us when 
in these monuments we see symbols, through which we not only 
recognize specific forms of life, but bS6virtue o~ which we 
are able to restore, them for ourselves. 
The historian" ,like the scientist, lives in the physical world. But: 
the data of history, unlike those of the natural seien,ces', is not. 
initially physical or material. Historical "facts" acquire a phYSical, 
pbjective meaning only through an:~analysis of their symbolic meaning•. 
The historian discove'rs Ufacts". through the mediat:lon of symbols:.. 
. "Not things or events bot documents or monuments are·th~ first and 
immediate objects of our historical knowledge. Only through' the ~~di-
ation and intervention of these ~ymbolic data can w-a g:r;asp the real . 
.. . 
.hi~to;ic'ai d~t:a---the e';'en~s a~d the men of the past. u57 Historical 
'. 
"facts" are symbolized in "monuments" and ~ocuments. The historian 
returns to these "facts" through an analysis o'f this symbolic data. 
"Symbolic reconstructionU is the label Cassirer. gave to the proc­
ess of interpreting tl:tis "symbolic data. n Symbolic data is gathered 
and "remembered. n, Critical judgments are made, the data is arranged. 
in serial Qrder in time and space, further' judgments are· made-, the 
"facts" in the "monument'" are discerned, more reconstruction takes 
place, and eventuallY' the historical event in all its significance is 
depicted. TIle process is not one of simple reproduction of the past. 
.. I. " 
-: J .. ~. ,. . . ~,,',' . ~. .. 
• ~ ~i .... ~ ._ _ ~." ?; '.: .~~ : .~ .. 
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Cassirer recognized 'the impossibility of such an endeavour. Historical 
analysis is a recreation, he said, a une'tv int-ellectual synthesis,. a 
ItS8constructive act .. 
The'meaning of' a his torical' It fact'" can never be discerned ,,,i th:'" 
out this reconstruction. An' attempted reproduction ,and isolation of 
the event would give only a small portion of the meaning, Cassirer 
contended. The histori~nts work is never done. Historical analysis 
,and synthesis is an en,dless, assignment. ,No singl~ flreconstruct~onn 
has ,a purely objective certitude t but must be subjec'ted. to continual 
analysis in the future. 
The "constructive act~1t again, demands the historian to make 
interpretive judgments on the data before him. Tnese judgments 
have a double face. They are~-t'...ecessarily subjective" -b~t, the his........­
torian must st:rive ·for dbjectivit!y.- He cannot exca~ hi"s mm expe'ri­
ence and predelictions ~lhen making judgments. He should. ho'tvever, 
be :R..1are of his passions without haing passionate.:. __ "History is a 
history of..passions" but if history att.empts to be p~~"sio~ate, it.. 
ceases to be history.uS9 Judgments about the .past are inescapably 
they force the investigator to enlarge his perspective beyond the 
, immediacy and pure subjectivity of the "moment: 
By making us cognizant of. the polymorph.ism of h'uman existence 
it [history] frees us from the freaks and prejudices of a 
I 
1 
J 
II, 
204. 
,- , ' 
_" 
...... ~. p 
I 
31 
! 
, ' 
special and single moment. It is this enrichment and enlarge­

ment, not the effacew.ent,. of the self, of our knowing and 

feeling ego, tvhich is the aim of historical kno'tY'ledge. 60 

History does not concentrate on the individual ego) but on the 
collective .ntan. It· 1s anthropomorphic., ;But obJectivity remains a 
goal for the his,torian.· History and historic~l judgments ,comprise an 
, 61
"objective anthropomQrphism." 
Enlargement of the self--"objective anthropomorphismu--is' ,the 
. . 
.aim of historical analysis and judgment. Logic is the means. ,The 
·doing of history is a ,hermeneutical process, an.interpratatLon prQ-, 
cedur,e t entailin,g a logical analysis of symhols as they e:<ist in 
Hmonuments,lt in documents, in the ph~nomena' of the past. Historical 
judgments are therefore both·universaland particular. Historical 
analysis'does hot have a .logic of its -mm, for logic i's univa'r~al ... 
Judgments are. universal because -'logic. is universal. They are universal 
in runction"as " ... thought iS',always univ~rsal.n62 ,But they are-
also particular in their. orient,ation' beca~se th~y _.;ie,a], with p~~ticular 
historical phen,omena. Judgme.nts are a unity in multiplicitY:t a Tflult~-
plicit;y in unit4y.. ,Analys:is and.. synth~si~ of particulars are inex­
tricably conjoined by the rules of universal logic. 
********** 
:me ,form and function of. :ideas., rather than their subs,tance: and, 
6(}Ibid. ,. p. 212 .. 

61Illi.. , p. 211.. 

62Ibid•• p. 206. 
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llistorical meaning resides in becoming; it is not merely a category 
of being. Symbols mus.t be analyzed--umonumen'ts" and "worksn, must be 
exanlined--ln terms of their function in the stream of cultur.al , 
.id~ation·. '. Neaning is',not ~emporal and static, it -is systematically, 
fl.!I1ctional and, dynamic. There is a certain c,ontinuity in, ,substanc.e. 
~assir~r_believed. Certain ideas change slowly in their content. But-
the ·function of these ideas can change·.dramatically~, giving meaning to 
an entire age. Cassirer best .stated. this concept through a river meta-
Nevertheless the dist:f.nction [batwe-en. }·:iddle Ag~s and Renaissance] 
haa a real meaning. 'tfuat we can express by itt and tvhat. alone 
we in.tend ,to expres's, i.5 that _trom the beginning of the. fifteenth 
century onward' the balance between the particular.forces--society, 
state, ·,religion,- church, art,· science--hegins to shift slowly. 'N'ew 
forces press up out of the depths and alter the previous equilib­
rium.' And ~ha tharacteJ; 'of,~e.yery. culture res,ts on the _,equilibrium 
he tween the force,S that give it form. tfn~never t therefore, we 
ma,ke -any .comparison bet'tveen the }tiddle Ages- and the R~naissance,-
it is neveL to single out particular ide.as or concepts. \·]hat \Ve 
want. to know i.s not the particu~at" idea as such, but the impor­
tance it possesses, and the strength '<lith which it is acting in 
the whole structure. '1~liddle Ages f and t Renaissance' are two 
g~eat and mighty streams of ideas. When we single out from 
them a parti~iJl?r ,idea, we ~.r~ do:tne Hh~e .a ~'tt~~i~t.. do~s i'[1.. , 
analyz~ng the water of a stream· or what a geographer does in 
trying to trace it to its sQurce_ No one de~ies that these 
are interesting and important questions. But they ~~e neither 
the only nor the more'irttportant for the historian of ideas. 
The historian of ideas knows that the"water 'tvhichthe Mi-iver 

carries wi th it changes only very slowly. The same ideaS are·' 

ah~ays appearing again.-·and again, and are maintained for· cen­
.turies. The force and the tenacity of tradition can hardly. be 
overestimated. From this poin.t of view. ~.,e mus't acknowledge 
that there -is nothing new under the sun. But the historian· 
of ideas is not asking primarily to/hat the substance is of par­
ticular ideas. He is .asking 't..rhat ·their function is. What he 
is Rtudy:ing--or should be studying--is less the content of ideas, 
than their d~amics. To continue the figure. we could say that 
he is not trying to analyze the drops of water in the river, but 
that he is seeking. to measure 'its' width 'and depth and ascertain 
the force and ve'locity of the current. It is all·these· factors, 
!
. i 
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that are fundamentally altered in the Renaissance; the dynamics 
of ideas have changed. 63 
The "function" of ideas, then, consists of their "dynamics" in rela­
tion to the "equilibrium bet,\leen the forces" that give a culture its 
form. The historian must focus on how ideas are used by different 
thinkers, how these ideas "func tion" as cultural e':.cpressions in th-e 
cultural milieu. 
For example, the view of knowledge elucidated by Nicholas 
Ct:SUi1US in De docta ignorantia r,-epresent.ed a fT completely new tot.al 
/ 
/' 
.systems of later thinkers, one, that "las to make Cusanus lithe fi.rst 

mode'rn thinker. It " . J... Quite simply, CUSantlS argued that the two types 

of rl.~a.litYt" the ab~ol.ute and the empirical,' the infinite and the 

finite It are conjo:Lned in the '\lay they are known •. The empir'ical fitlit'e 

't.,orld can be known positive.ly,. through comparison and measurement, 

and tha absolute infinite reality can then: be defi~ed in terms of 

, what it ..!2..~, in- terms of what" the finite world is .. 66 This concapt 
of knmolledge, as it vIas" explained in de tail :i.n ]?e Eocta ignorantia 
I 
had a role in the systems of later thinkers, Cassirer·believed. It 

was significant both in the possibilities it offered and in the 

'63Ernst Cassirer, nSom~ Remarks on the Question of the Original­
ity of the Renaissance," Journal of the 'History ~'Ideas, "Vol.. 4 (1943), 
p.. 5.5 .• 
64Erns t Cassirer, The Iudividual nnd the Co'smos it'!." Renaissance 

Phl}o~oEhy ~ trans ~ Ha"rio-Domandi (~ew York: Barnes and Noble, 1963), 

p.. ).'). 

·65]:bid."~ p. 10· .. · 
.66~., p. 11. 
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orientation it took. Indeed, it constituted the single most important 
doctrine in the thought of the Renaissance, and its. importance'1;-la5 a 
67functional one. 
Shaftesbury's concep-t of "disinterested pleasure,u68 Lessing's 
. f i . h9 , i d f' n .,.. It 70V1ew 0 rat ona11ty,' Rousseau s ea 0 tne state o! nature -­
these ~1d othe~ ideas were· explained by Cassir~r' in functional -terms. 
For example, Lessing's'view of rationality--that'reason-~ -as it is 
-immanent in history, provides a guide to natural religious truth--is 
~mport~nt" ·becau~~··9f:. i't£? ro~e. id.'. lat:-er th~ori~ing' on .'tl.is~~ry;.: 
He [Lessing] has always been the great rationalist, and he 
. 'remained so to the' last; ,but he' replaces' artalytit.al reasOn' 
\-lith synthetic reason,. and static' reason with -dyn,amic reason. 
Reason does not exclude motion; it' seeks' rather to' understand 
the immanent law of motion. It is reason itself that now 
plunges. into the stream of becoming,' not in order to be 
seized an~ carried along by its swirls but in order to find 
here-·its own· security and assert its stability and constancy. 
·"In this·-idea of r.eason·we hav.e .the dawn of'a new"conc-eption 
of the 'natur~ and truth of llistory which could n~t achieve 
maturity, perfection, and confirmation in the realm of theology 
and metaphysics. It'is Herder who ·takes the last and decisive. 
step in this development "-'lhen he directs his question at 
his torical reality as a ~vhole and tries to answer· it on the 
basis of the concrete evidence on its phenomena. But Herder's 
.	contribution is only in appearance an isolated achievement. 
It does not1represent a break with the thought of the Enlight­
enment but evolves slowly and steadily from this thought and 
67 .Ibl.d., p. 7; also see IOf, 23f, 41 t 56'; for its role in the 
thinking--or-Ficino, 63£; in Picots .thinking~ 87f. 
68Ernst Cassirer, TIfE! ~latonic Rena.iss·a~~e t· trans •. J. P·.· 

Pettygrove (Austin: University of Texas Press, ~95.3~t p. 195 • 

. 70Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant~ .Goe.the, trans~ James Gutmann, 
£aul Kristelle.r, John H_ Randall, Jr. (Princeton: Pr~nceton University 
Preis, 194j)~ ~. 10. 
" ,, /. ~:.....1 .....: ..... 
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matures on its soil. The probl~m of history for the philosophy 
, the Enlightenment arises in the field of religious phenomena, 
and it is here that this problem first be.comes urgent.}l 
Lessi.ng's "idea 'of reasonu '!;V'as im.portant for the role it played in 
,his mm ,philosophical system.. But. it was also' significant because 
it rep'resen.ted the IIda'tyn of a new conception of the nature, and truth 
of h.istory." His "idea of reason" had a func.tional importance in 
later theorizing on 'histo~y•. Further,' Spin6za, Le,ssing,~ and other 
Enlightenment thinkers produced ideas that, in their functional 
4evelopment,~ played a part ,in",Her-dar"s. thinking on his'tory and e'4ien';;'" 
tua,~ly ,contributed to the op~ri:ing of; the: u~-Jho12 horizqn, pf,,, the his-, 
torical \vorld. ,,72 
*********..'c 
'Cassirer was fairly consistent in' this- emphasis ,on' ft..ttt<;tion ~ 
on synthe'sis, and on ~he dynami~s of ideas. He was also consistent 
in the manner l.n ~vhich he app'roached these' dynaniics., i~' the method 
he used to identify those cultural functions that characterized a 
particular thinkEbr, group, or age. He uS'ually began" at least 
ostensibly, with the individual and the phenomena of the individualts 
u~·lm:·ks f H r.:.oved into broader generalizations about groups of thinkers 
an~ concepts, ,and ev~ntually' came to some conclusions about the 
n .• t" f' \. .sp1r~ 0 t~e agaw 
71The Philosophy of the Enlightenllle~t, pp. 195-196 .. 
72Ibid. fI p.,,' '196; .also cf. 182-196•. 
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"Rousseau's fundamental thought," Cassirer a't'gued~ "puts before 
us an objective formulation of ques tions; and this formulation is 
valid not for him'or his era alone but contains, in full sharpness 
'. 73 
..and <;iefiniteness, an inner, strictly objective necessity." He. 
attempted ~Q delineate th.e "systema.tic coren of _Rou~se~u' 5 nfundament~l .. 
74
·d u	 tt1 ea~ and conc~udad that Rousseau ~as a true son of the Enlight­
enment,. even when he attacks it and triumphs over it.n7~ ; Similarly~' 
Nicholas Cusanus -represented the focal point, the point of departure".­
,. 
. ot tne Quat.tx;:o.ce.nto: '·'H;s- .. thought 'blossoms out of pne ~Q.t~11~H'!t4al
. 	 . ~ ... .... -.-. . ." .'.~. ;; 
, ­
ser:!d (De docta ign.aran tia) that progres~_ive1:y ~.mf~lds a.n~t .l:~ this 
p-rocess of unfolding, absorbs the entire range and the entire 
"76Problernatik of kndwledge in the Quattrocenta. If Ne'tvton and Leibniz
------ , 
represented VIlO alternative ufundaI!len tal philosophic methods'~: 
choose between 0010 alternatives. In the dispute be~ween' Newton and 
Leibniz these alternatives "tvere cle.arly indicated. It77 
" '. 
'When analyzin~> the Cambridge Plato~ists, ,Cassir~r concentrated 
! ' more on the philos"ophy of the .group .a$ a coherent. "whole" than on . 
the 'individuals within the' group. But still, he purported to shOt'" 
73E~nst Cassirer, The ~estion of ~-Jacques Rousseau, trans. 
Peter 	Gay (New Yo~k: Columbia University Press,. 1954), p. 40. 
74philosoehx of the Enli~hte~ment, -p. 2-58~ 
75~o" p.' 274. 
I I 
70The Indi",idual and the CosmQs, P e.. 7 .. 
77Ernst Cassirer, nNewton and Leibniz, U The ~1:i16s0ph~ 
w~aVie1-1, Vol. 52 (1943), pp.. 366. 
... .~ ".~: 
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n78how they represented a "genuine ancient philosophical tradition.
His statement of intent in this essay gave a good metaphorical summary 
of his method. 
What this stu~y 4~s inten~ed to show is t~is: .that the pr~~lems 
with which the Cambridg~ men wrest'led are not' antiquated, but 
have entered directly into the formation of the modern phil­
osophical world; and that their influence in an altered form 
persists today. The Cambridge School forms a sort of connect­
ing-link between minds and epochs; it is one of the piers of 
that bridge linking the Italian Renaissance with Ge~an human­
. ism of the eighteenth. century: The course of the history of 
thought does not advance from peak' to peak,; .. and the history 
of ideas cannot be adequately treated~ it, as is still the 
practice of ,the historian of/philosophy. consideration is 
'given' only to the ,graa't. philosophical systems. If 'arie would 
understand the significance of ideas, one ,ca~~ot overlook 
. 'their imane'rit structure. But our' insight into this structure 
is possible only when, instead of concentrat.1.ng our attention 
exclusively on the high points of the great systems, we take 
our way through the, valleys and from there' b~ a gradual .and 
patient ascent work our way up to the peak. 7 
Cassirer's analysis moved from the inf:lividuals--the "valleys"--to' 
the "spirit" or "mind" of the epoch, the "peaks" in ·the range. 
The same method was explained in his introduction to TIle Phi-' 
losophy of the Enlightenment:' 
The real philosophy of the Enlightenment is not simply the 
sum tot~l ofl what its leading thinkers--Voltaire and 
Montesquieu, Hume or Condillac, d'Alemhert or Diderot, 
Wpl£~ or Lambert--thoug~t and taught.... ,It canJ;lot. be pr~-
sented in a summation of the views of these men, nor in the 
temporal sequence of thei~ views; for it consists less in 
certain individual doctrines than in the form and manner of 
intellectual activity in general. < The fundamental'inte1lectual 
fO,rce~ with which we' are here c.oncerned can' be grasped only in 
action and in the constantly 'evolving process of ,thought, only 
in process can the pulsation of the inner intellectual life 
of the EnIigh.tenment. 1;le fe~t.8.o 
78The Platonic .Renaissan'ce, 'p. 202 •.· 
79Ibid., p. 201. 
80The PhilosophI,E! the Enlightenment, p. ix. 
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By arfalyzing the doctrines of indiviuuals and synthesizing those 
functional elements representing the epoch, the "philosophy of the 
Enlightenment" \Vas de:.ffined. Cassirer follovled the same procedures ;i.n 
his. other historical works. 
In synthesizing the dynamics of the "formation of modern thoughtU 
Cassirer concentrated on the problems different .·thinkers discuss •.. 
rather ~~a~., t~e relaJ:~d.th~~s of their ideas, on .Eroblematik rather 
._ ~ • "'.' '\r.. .:. .... .; ~, 
than Thematik. ..He 't,;Tas in t~res'ted primarily .in the questions asked 
-rather than the solutions reached, an' emphC:lsis corresponding to his 
'concentration on function and on the dynamics of thought. Ideas are 
problematical in their development, he contended. Their "full deter­
mination" in any other terms can take centuries: 
The his tory of philosophy shows us very cle·arly that the full 
'de termination of a concept is very rarely the ~vork_ of that 
thinker who first.introduced that concept. For a philosophical 
concept is,. generally speaking, rather a problem than the solu­
tion of a problem--and the full significance of ~his problem 
cannot be understood so long as it is still in its first 
implicit stage. It must heconte explici t in order to be··,com­
prehended in its true ~eaning, and ·this transition from an 
inplicit to an explicit state is the. work o~ the. future.8~ 
Concepts are only illusively static in their initial statement, 
Ca'ssirer believed•. ·Th·ey should be" seen in te·rms of the questions 
they pose ·and the function they have in the development· of thought. 
0nly then can· tlf.~11 deteminat:i6n" of' any.· ide.a be .compr:el;1ended • 
. '81Es~ay, pp. 199-200. 
,." "". ~ ~.. ., 
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Some problems are so pervasive in specific historical periods as 
to characterize those periods, Cassirer believed. One of the most 
significarit ~robiems' of the Renaissance, tor example, was the question 
o~. the sUbject-'obJect" relati:onship; of .tbe ihteraction l>etwe'en f;tni.te 
ego and infipi~e cosmo~; 
Man, the Ego, appears to the Universe, the world, at once as 
the enclosing and the enclosed. Both determinations are equally 
~ndispensable to express the. relationship to the cosmos. And.' 
thus a continuous mutual reaction and continuous interaction 
takes place between them • • • The ~go can face the infinite 
cosmos inasmuch as it finds within itself the principles by 
't~hich .it knows .tllat;the COSIn,?s' is infin~te•. But this. knowledge, .' 
itself is not of a ~ereiy abstract or 'of a purely discursive 
kind. It is an intuitive certainty that springs, and contin­
uously rushs' forth, not from the logical intellect but from 
the specific. and vital. principle of the Ego • • • The philosophy 
of the Renaissance never resolved the dialectical antinomy·that 
is enclosed in this double relationship. But it has the indis­
putable merit of having determined the problem and handed it' 
'down in a new form to the ToIlowing centuries, the centuries- -_ ..­
of exact science and ~yst,ematic philosophy. 82 
The "dialectical antimony" between Ego and the Cosmos was .the most 
characteristic problem of Renaissance philosophy. Cassirer argued. 
And i~ had a functional importance that transcended the epoch, that, 
played a role, in the thinking of "following centurie·s. If 
Cassirer also used a problem approach to the ideas of the 
Cambridge Platonists. Some of the questions they considered~,he 
contende'd, were of considerable·.sign~~ica,nce in ,the development of the 
European "mind": 
Mere, within a narrov circle of thinkers:and in a remote 
section of the learned world, questions were being 'hammered· 
0':1~ which are to ~ff~c::t t.~e very, ~o1)cepti:oYl: an.d stru~ture 
8ZThe Individual and !!:!!:. Cosmos, pp. 190-'191. 
. .. .'" - ~ . 
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I , 
of the modern mind.' The following considerations endeavour 
to show in what light the Cambridge School viewed these 
questions, under what presuppositions it form~l~ted them, 
and by what means it tried to solve them. 83 
When discussing the Cambridge Platonists, as in his discussions of 
other nistorical periods~·Cassirer asserted'~ belief in the'recurrence 
or even contiri,uity of specific p'roblems in different chronological 
periods. His contention that there uis nothing new under the sunH 
except in the manner in which problems function in the Ustreamlt of 
ideas i'g seen in the above examp,le, as in o'thers. 84 A focus on the 
, • 'cha'racteristic' pr~bl~~s ' of:' ea~h' pe~i~d~:' a~d ' the~' 'on their' dynainic 
role in the making of the umodern mind" is seen in all of Cassirer's 
',historical writings. 
It can be argued, of course, that such an emphasis transform~ 
dynamics into statics, that an analysis and synthesis of function 
transforms it into something, substantial"something other than what 
it is. But such is the procedure of "symbolic reconstruction. 1t The 
historian cannot 'reproduce history; it must be recreated. In the 
proce,ss, certain unIties of functional serial orders are defined. 
! 
These unities became historical substance within the content of 
Cassirer's synthesis. 
********** 
These functional unities do not have a real existence in a 
particular epoch, but are heuristic, logical unities. They serve 
83Th~ Platonic Renaissance, p. 7. 
84 ' See above, p. 26. 
---------
. ' 
! 
I 
! ; 
I 
41 
only to explain, not to describe the reality of the epoch. When dis­
cussing the dispute over Burckhardt's definition of the Renaissanee, 
Cassirer outlined .one of these unitt.es: 
Our controversy as to the originality of the Renaissance and, 
as to the diViding.....line 'between' the··sRenafssanee t. and the 
'Middle Ages' seems to me.in many ways rather a 'logical' 
dispute than one about historical facts. Ideas like 'Gothic,· 
:fRenaissance t ' or 'Baroque' are ideas 'of historical •style'. t 
As to the meaning of these ideas. of 'style' there still prevails 
a"gre~t lack'of clarity in'many respects. They can be· used 
to characterize and interpret intellectual movements, but they 
express no actual historical facts that ever existed at any 
time. 'Renaissance' and 'Middle Ages' are, strictly speaking, 
,not names for historical periods at all, but they are concepts 
'. or 'i.deal types',' in .Max W~be-rts ,sense. 'We cannot th~refbre 
use them as instruments for any strict division of periods; 
we cannot inquire at what temporal point the Middle Ages 
'stopped' or the 'Rennaissance' began. The actual historic~l 
facts c,ut across ang extend ove'r each other in the most5complicated manner. 
He discussed this concept of. "unities" more carefully in The Logic 
of the Humanities. 
.. 
What we are trying to give expression to here is a unity 0.£ 
direction, not a unity of actualization·... The part'icular 
individuals belena together, not because they are alike or 
resemble each other, but because they are cooperating in !!,.' 
common task, which, in contrast to the Middle Ages, we perceive 
to be new8:'nd to be the distinctive 'mea:ning' of the Renaissance.• 
All genuine Iconcepts of style in the humanities reduce, when 
analyzed more precisely', to such conceptions of meaning. The 
artistic style of an epoch cannot be determined unless we gather 
into a unity all its divergent and often patently disparate 
artis tic e'xpressions • • • Such expressions do indeed characterize 
but they do not determine; for the particulars which they co~ 
prehend' cannot 'be de'duced from them • 
B~t it is equally incorrect to infer from this that we have 
only intuitive descripti~n here, and not conceptual character­
ization; wa are dealing with a distinctive manner and direction 
.or cha'fact,eriza§~on, 't.,ith. a. logico-intellectual activity, which 
is sui seneris. : 
85u Some Remarks on the Question of ~he Originality of the Renais­
'sance. ff pp. 54-55.', 
8tThe Logic'of the Humanities, pp. 139¥140. 
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Cassirer's concept of nlogico-intel1ectualu unities of meaning 
based on historical. ttstyle" is not one of his clearer ideas. It 
tied ,in closely with his advocacy, of "the need, for a '~general struc­
.n8~ " and organize • • • facts. An analysi:s and synthesis' of the COlmlon . 
questions asked by a group of thinkers and of the function those 
questions have in: th'e i~teliect~l ~ystems 0'£ 'those thinkers as well 
as in the t,ho,ught of later thinkers expresses a "unity of direction, fI,_' , 
a ncharact~riz~tionU of an, ag~. ! Th,e, .~ateg0o/ of "character:lzation,n-­
-the' 'Jl Renalssant.e, n .. the UEnlightenment," the' nmod~rn min~', II 'e_tc~~does 
not have a real. historical existence. The "characterization" does 
not describe the reality of the period. The particular facts of the 
historical reality cannot be deduced from the I~characterization. n, 
But th'e particulars--the "facts" discerned behind the 'umonuments"­
are grouped by the historian a~cording to their commonal~ty of function 
and their unity of "direction." The resulting-synthesis 1s a heuris­
tic one, a "logieo-intellectual" category which is sui ganeris, which 
interprets the ~'intellectual movement" but does not embody -its specj.f1c 
historical reality.
11 
********** 
Empirical analysis-"symbo11c' reconstructionU--of the "monuments~' 
combined. with imaginative recreation of the "facts!) behind ·the ttmonu-, 
- menta'" produces his,torieal, knowledge.' A close, analysis and synthesis, 
87Essay, pp. 75-76. 
' .... 
. ,,' '\ 
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of the ItDlonum~nts,n centered on Problematik and function, yields those 
meaningful unities which constitute history. And this knowledge has . 
a special place 'in the "organism of human" civilization, U Cassirer main­
t;ain~d.~ 88 +t is a necessary,component of 'man's se1.f-knowle.dge, ~'an ' 
•• ~ 	 ., • • ..' -' .' • • .... .o. '" • 
, , . , 89 
indispensible instrument for building up our human universe." By 
understanding man's Itworks"-his cultural expre'ssions--in the past 
and by recreating the history of the creative process, Cassirer be­
lieved man can better view his own potentialities. Histori,cal. m~1l'lory 
. 	 is a ~ecess,ary co~~::)'~~nt ,of: ~n' S. ~uture life and of.. .his, freedom. 
Cassirer believed history to be the process of revealing man to h~-
self, 'that he can' better free himself of the limitations placed upon' 
him by contemporary cultural expressions. Historical reconstruction 
embodies this -freedom. In history and in the historical perspective 
exis,ts the objective proof 'of "hUlIlanisti"c potential. of tnan's con­
sciousness, of freedom in necessity. 
88Ipid., p.,- 22~. 
89Ibid., p. 228. 
'" 
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CHAPTER V 
FUN,eTION Ai'iD THE RAGE. FOR COHERENCE: 
, ' 
THE Pl~IGM CRITICIZED 
It would be an overstatement to say Cassirer left no loose ends 
lying about. Despite -his penchant for structural' Uunities" he was 
simply not as systematic as he wanted to be. The Philosophy of the 
. .. Enli.ghte~mtJit, f~r- example,' ~ppears to be ,a ~ollec-tion of conne'cted 
essays, rather than a systematic work defining, in all its unity, 
the "mind" of the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, Cassirer intended to 
be coherent and systematic and he intend~d his works to be seen. as 
related unities. He constantly referred back to his earlier works 
when writing about certain topics. He saw his various works on 
history as having organic connections, much as he saw the relation~ 
ships between the epochs he was analyzing. And he made statements 
of intent within each work that belie any attempt to see his'works 
I 
as anything but systematic unities. For example, in the introduction 
to The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy he stated 
his intent accordingly: 
What is needed is the' universality of a systematic point of 
view and of a systematic orientation which in no way coincidea 
with the universality· of merely empirical concepts used in 
.the. perio,dization, of. ·bistory for c9nye,nient .classification. 
To supply this will be the aim of the following study • • • 
. it int~nds t.e; remain within. the realm ,of the hist,ory of, phi~­
'osophical pro~lems, and 'to seek, on 'that basis, to. answer the, 
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question: whether and to what extent the movement of thought 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries constitutes a self­
contained unity despite the mUltiplicity of starting points '90 
and the divergence of solut,iQ~s to, the various problems, posed. 
, '91 
In -his '~'Platonie' Renaissance, he stated a simil~r' intent, as 
..... " 
- . . ". ~ 
did in'~ PhilosophY' o'f ~ Enlightenment: 
I 
e fundamental ~ntellectua1 forces with which we are here 
oncerned can be grasped only in action and in the constantly 
volving process of thought;· only in·process can the pulsationE
IQf the inner intellectual life of the Enlightenment be felt • • • ~e present book bas tried to accomplish this taskt'not by 
~ndeavoring to give a history of individual thinkers and their 
tea~hing but by mean~ of. ~ hist~ry of the ideas of the epoch " 
.' 6f "t.ne Eri.,lighten~eni ~.',.: ';.: 'Th,~i a1m of. 'this' "p,oQk ~aS simply to ... 
develop and to explain historically and systematically the 
content and point of view of the philosophy of the En1ight· 
enment. 92 
Even Cassirer's revisions of facts could not escape the struc­
tural artifice he created: 
I avail myself of this opportunity to revise a forme,r statement 
made in my Individuum and Kosmos. In the'second chapter·I 
tried to show that Nicholas of Cusa's philosophy exerted a· ' 
strong influence on the .general development of Italian thought 
in the'Quattrocento. I still think this. to be highly probable, 
but I should perhaps have spoken w~th more caution. I quite 
agree that, on the strength of new historical evidence, we ' 
can not give a ,direct and definite,proof of this thesis. It 
is possible that Ficino conceived his general theory inde­
pendently of Nicholas of Cusa. In this C'ase the close, relation­
ship between the two thinkers would be all the more. important 
and interesting from the pOint of view of the general history 
of ideas. For ,it would'show us-the connnon background' of the 
philosophy of the fifteenth century--,the general intellectual 
and· religious -atmosphere of the 'Renaissance.93 
r ~ • • 
.90The Individual- and the Cosmos, pp,.. 5,- 6. 
91The Platonic Renaissance~ pp. 5t 7. 
92The PhilosophZ of 'the Enlightenment, pp. ix,-x, xi. 
93Ernst Cassirer, .uFicino's Place in Intellectual, Biat.oIy," 
Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 6 (1945}, p. 492.
----- -- . 
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The structure was of primary importance, and "facts" had to be organ­
ized within the structure. 

I have therefore chosen to consider Cassirerts 'works as a 

"fairly 'consistent 'unit'y, despite my criticisms of ,him for doing't,he' 
same with other thinkers., It is assumed in· the following critique 
·that Cassirer consistently followed a structural paraidgm, and that 
he refused to sacrifice it to reconcile anomalies. A number of logical 
errors in his works will be criticized, but the main focus of the 
cri~.ici~ms wiJl be on ,h~s m~s~i qf. str.ucture, o,n his ,,"rage for
. ,. ." 
coherence." 
When reading Cassirer, one has difficulty sep,erating structur~ 
and facts, metaphysics and phenomenology. ,His writings are filled 
with references, to "motifs, n, "essential problems, It "cores," "the 
modem mind," the "Renaissance," the "Enlightenment," and other cate­
gories of similar breadth. Cassire,r claimed to be using such catego,ries 
as nlogieo-historical ideal typesU as heuristic devices to "charac.­
i n a d b ut not to d·b i ts . 1 f aetna ~ty~94ter ze peri 0 escr~ e histor~ca 1" 
However, if his int~nt is ignored, and these categories are 
viewed as having some substantive descript~ve reality, two further 
possibilities present themselves. Eash category as a whole c.an be 
'crftiqUed for its real historical ~xistence, or the faet"s "tyithin' the 
category can be critiqued similarly!"'" In the latter ~~se, the categoTy 
can be seen as the Stm" of indiVidual realities. 
"", 
~ ': _~ • • ~ : I 
" •• : ,:. .. •(. 't ~ ~ 
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The two views~ then--that Cassirer used such' labels ,as logical 
structural de:vices, or that he used them as descriptive devices-can 
be critiqued. ,If the former view i~ accepted ,and Cassi~er'~ categor-: 
ies are viewed as nlogieo-historical 'sni.'generis," with the meaning 
in the category itself, then his works defining the "Renaissance," 
the "philosophy of the· Enlightenmetlt, If the "core" of Rousseau's thought, 
and others are idealist solipsisms or at best, fictions. Or if the 
categories are assumed to have some substantive meaning, an abundance 
of criticisms are encountered. 
.. .. ! ... . : 
Kingsley Price, in an article on The Philosophy of the Enlight­
'enment, critiques the possibility that a "mind of the EnlightenmentH 
diu" ex~st.95• He quotes Cassi'~er s stated i ntenti on: 
The real philosophy _of the_Enl.ightenment, is, not s'imply the sum,._ 
total of what its leading thinkers ••.• thought and taught. 
It cannot be presented in a summation of the views of these 
men~ nor in the temporal sequence of, their views, for it ' 
consists less in certain individual doctrines than i~6the 
,.form and manner of intellectual activity in general. 
The idea of the '''philosophy of the Enlightenment" as some vague 
composite of individual doctrines in terms of general "Intellectual 
activity~' seems an inexplicable illusion to Price. Cassirer warned 
the reader, Price notes, that he did not intend to discuss "certain 
~ndividual doctrines," nor the summation of the doctrines of individual 
.. .. 
writers .. And, 11 ••• having been assured that, neither of these is 
appropriate, without having been given, any positive indication as to 
95Kingsley Price, HErnst Ca~sirer and the Enlightenment," Journal 
of 'the History of Ideas, vol. 18 (1957), pp. 101-112. ' 
96See above~ p. 28. 
48 

what will do, the phrases 'thought of the eighteenth century,' 'mind 
of the Enlightenment,' and their fellows remain without meaning for 
us ••• under these conditi.ons' the. attempt to sunman'an idea of an 
'epoch or a century"engaged in thought .collapses utterly.1'r9!'.. The idea ­
that the categories have a descriptive substantive meaning fails 
miserably. 
If it is argued, however, that Cassirer concentrated on individ­
ual thinkers and their ideas in, his historical works, and that his 
icategoJ;i~,s wer.e me:(e~y co.mpo~it~s o,f these, ideas," he is. liable to 
even more criticism.' He confused the structure of the categories and 
the facts of the ,situation,.-, arranging the facts to meet the criteria ','--­
of the structure. Further', in the process of trying to describe the 
logical progression of ,ideas, ,he made several errors of logic. 
The individual thinkers and their'ideas become fleshless parts 
of the structure. Cassirer didn't compare diffe~~nt thinkers, he-
reconciled them. He· found a niche for everyone he considered. 
Rousseau was a "true son of the Enlightenment" even in his attack on 
the nr;nlightenm~nt.n Herder, with his innovations in historical 
thought, was also seen as part of the unity of the "philosop'hy of the 
Enlightenment": 
And yet, much as he outgrows the intellectual world' of the 

Enlightenment, Herder's, break with his age was not abrupt~ 

ILis progress and ascent were possible only by following the 

trails blazed by' the Enlightenmen't. This age forge'cl' the 

weapons with which it was finally defeated; with 'its, own 

97price, pp. 108-109., 
. "'~ ~. . 
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clarity and consistency it established the permises on which. . 
Herder based his inference. The conquest of the Enlightenment 
is therefore a genuine self-conquest. It is one of those 
defeats which really denote a victory, and Herder's achieve­
ment is in fact one of the greatest intellectual triumphs of 
the philosophy of the Enlightenment. 98-' '. . . 
- .' . ~ 
The histQry of individual thinkers becomes the pistory of abstractions, 
analyzed in terms of their relationship to the structure. The ponder-· 
Ous "mind of the Enlightenment,1t like other categories 'Cassirer used, 
keeps reappea~ing as the ,supreme arbiter•. 
Quentin Skinner t in his essay "Meaning and Understanding in the .. 
History of Ideas," 'identifies'several fallacies'of logic applicable 
to Cassirer's paradigm, and these can be added to the above.cri~1cisms?9 
Again~ Cassirer's stated intent will be ignored, and the history of 
the Renaissance or the history of the Enlightenment will be taken as 
the history of ind~vidual works~ --Skinner is concerned with: looking at 
the problem of procedure in arriving at' 'an understanding· of -a' -work ... 
~---""",-" .... --- ...*,-..-... • 
His analysis of the "school" that concentrates on the· text itself in' 
dOing this includes several useful .critic~sms.. ~racing the histOrica.l .' 
development of a doctrine~ Skinner says, leads to several logical 
absurdities. First of all, to do so is to ~ssume that there is an 
.. ~ 
"ideal type" of the given doc~rine. and that it· is .immanent .. in history t 
even if it is not stated completely by an individual thinker... Most· 
of Cassi~e-rt.s nlogic~hi.storic~l,,.' '''~de~l 'typ~n categories are ~ubject. 
to this criticism.. Cas.sirer wrote about. individual wor.ks .as if .they' 
:­
98The Philosophy of the ,Enlightenment t p. 23.3. 
99Quentin Skinner~, IIMe~ning and Understanding in the His~ory .of 
Ideas," History and Theory, vol. 9 (1969), pp. '3-53. 
. ; ,., 
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were organic entities, immanent in the seedbed of history, and in the 
process of approaching the "ideal type," the category itse~f .. 
.Th~s' vif?~ of h.i,s~ory also leads to st;atelltents of. "anticipation, If . '.. 
Skinner argues._ - Cassirer was' continually guilty:,of .this error, of . 
seeing the ideas of one thinker "anticipating" .those of a later one. 
When discussing Shaftesbury, for example~ Cassirer contended that 
"Shafte~bury thus c.reated for the fir~t time a f~rm philosophica.l 
center for the future development of genius. ulOO An even better· ex­
ample comes with Cassirer's explanation of the consummation of Pico 
della Mirandola's philosophy in later centuries: 
For the influence of Pico.' s philosophy was great and manyMt 
sided, and extended to almost every realm of intellectual 
life. The great theme announced in his oration nne hominis 
dignitate" resounded thereafter in the most diverse variations~­
in a gradually stronger and stronger crescendo. We hear 
it in the religious conflicts of the age of the Reformation~ 
we hear it in the new philosophy of nature, and we shall 
finally hear it--though in altered fo~-in the modern 
rebirth of philosophical idealism, in Descartes and Leibniz. 
The aesthetics and the theory of art of the following , 
centuries likewise drew upon Pico and took from him many 
of the basic problems and themes • • • The ·occulta· con­
eatenatio· of his own basic ideas and of his seemingly 
incompatible theses Pica was hardly able to make clear even 
to himself~-much less to make accessible to his contemporaries. 
Only posterity, only the further' philosophical development of 
the problems, could bring it like. buried treasure to light. lOI 
PieD not ,only Hanticipated" later thinkers, his ideas found 
fruition only in.those thinkers. Cassirer's belief that'later inter-
praters of an individual's doctrine can understand the doctrine better 
lOaThe Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 318. 
lOlErnst Cassirer~ "Giovanni Pico della l-lirandola, n Journal of 
'the Histo~ of Ideas, Vol. 3 (1942). p. 345. 
': ~: ~ , 
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than that individual himself and his method of seeing the individual 
in terms of the "spirit" of the epoch fall .into a related fallacy,. 
the .fallacy 9f .prolepsis. He committed the .error .of giving each idea,.' 
. --'-':' -,,--- ..... 
doctrine, or '''work'' the shape of an organic entity that, in its 
historical function, approaches an immanent "ideal type." Each "work" 
is a seed-germ, growing to fruition only in the systems of later thirtk-· 
ers. Each "'t'1orkn has to await .the fu~ure to find it.s full meaning. 
Cassirer committed. another fallacy identified by Skinner, the 
fallacy of finding "coherence" ~hen it is not. reall.y there. He 
attempt~d to find the "core" of the philosophy of certain individuals 
in its relation to the group or age being discussed. His interpreta­
tion of Rousseau is the best example of his "rage for coherenc,e." 
Roussea~'s diverse influences on later thinkers is of no consequ~ce 
if att~ntion is directed only to a del~neation of his "fundamental 
thought." Further, the assumption that each oeuvre has a "coren and 

is a systematic unity is a redundant error in Cassirer's writings. 

-The only unity the oeuvre embodies is one of discourse or explanation 
on the part of Ithe investigator. , The oeuvre ~s a "reflexive category, tt 
a "principle of classification," used by the historian for. the 
purposes of explanation and, as such, .does not describe a historical 
reality ~ 102 Ca~sirer collect'ea the Ufacts~t of lndividual doctrines, 
l02Mlchel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledae, trans. A. M. 

Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 22. Foucault is con­

cerned here with dispelling the idea that the collected 'works of any 

,particular: thinker comprise a unity.' .The. concept ·of oeuvre, he, argues, 
'is a reflexive category of the investigatorts discourse and muSt be 
analyzed as such; th~t it constitutes an intrinsic and self-evident 
unity is simply a delusion. 
I. 
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of the ideas expounded by groups of thinkers, and the "spirit" of 
epochs into structural unities that become abstractions of the initial 
material. 
Another error Cassirer mad~ is seen in his assumptio~.that a 
delineation of the "function" of an idea will give the meaning of the 
idea. To do tllis, Skinq.er points out, "We cannot write about the 
idea itself, the sentence, but only about the st·atements. made about 
103the sentence." Cassire-r:~s "rage for coherence"- makes him suspect 
of abstraction again.. Even "furtction" was contingent on the unity of 
the scheme. 
Cassirer.'s use of Ufacts" was also affected by his deference 
to structure·, to the coherent scheme. Again,. the individual "facts" 
were important_only· in ~erms of the greater category. Cassirer be... 
lieved historical research to begin with the analysis of "monuments." 
Through this analysis, the "facts in the monumen.t" are dj.scerne.d. The 
. .. 
"facta" in each "monument" are dependent on thf:! relationship between 
"monuments. n . And as that relationship changes, the meaning o.f the. 
"facts" changes, accordingly. Cassirer made certain assumptions about 
theae relationships. He assumed, for example, that all of an indiv1d~ 
ual's writings, his oeuvre, constitute an organic and coherent whole • 
.. ' I~ some· cases,. most ,notably with the Cambridge Plat.onists, he assumed 
that the "monuments" wit~in a school o·f thinkers form a coherent whole. 
Tberefore,.the "factsU and the meaning of the Ufactstl form a coheJ;"ent 
.. 
... f ~ • .. .. .. 
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unity. Again, his "rage for coherence" leads him to defer to structure 
at the expense of the p·artic'l.llars of the ana1:ys"is~ 
I. 
Moreover·, the: "monuments" Cas·airer used revolved around" the 

thinking o·f·· individuals.'· He had little concept of, causa:lity. Econom­
• " ~ ~ •• :"'. '.~ .... ' '. .' <II .~" ... • ., .. • • 
I 
ical t political·,.· and psychological motivations are disregarded.-, He -did 

make a pallid, attempt to fill in a few of the details of Rousseau's 

" life, but these were obv~ously of small iIQ.p~rtance .in the light of, ~ 
Rousseau's intellectual documents. 104 Cassirer assumed a cognitive 
cornerstone for ·all ·intel·lectual ·constructs. The cognitive ,faculty 
is universal, he believed, and intellectual "monuments" represent.the 
workings of that faculty. They are symbolic artifices, created by 
the symbolizing mind, isolated from ~hei~ political, economical~ social 
and psychological environment&.~Q~ 
Cassirer gave the. reader' a topology of conceptual patterns. 

within a rQugh chrono!ogical'framework•. And even this framework was 

carelessly constructed." He~has been criticized for making blatant 

106
chronological' errors. And chronology was of little or no importance· 

when he discussed how one thin~er "anticipated" a later one, or how, 

an earlier doctrine found fulfillment in a later one. He noted 

l04Ernst Cassirer, ',The question of Jean-..Tacques Rousseau, trans. 

Peter Gay (Bloomington, Indiana: ~ndiana University Press, 196-7)", 

pp. 7-32. 

, 105ct~ Herbert "DiecktUann,' "An Interpretation of "the Ei-ghteenth 

Century," Modem Languaae Quarterly, vol. 15 (1954), p. 309; John 

Herman Randall, Jr., "Cassirer's Theory of History as Illustrated. in 

His Treatment of Renaissance Thought, II in The, Philosophy ~ Ernst . 

Cassirer, ed. Paul Schi1pp,. PPl> 703-4. uSo far as Cassirer's analysis 

goe~, It Randall comments, tlthought might as 't~ell be operating. in a vacuumt~ 

l06Diec~~ann, pp. 299, 303. 
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'similarities between the 'ideas of different thinkers regardless of 
their places in 'time or space. In a characteristic example~ Rousseau 
was compared to Leibniz; 
, Th:us Rousseau· .returned,. in a: :thoroughly in4ividp.al way, from 
Condillac to Leibtiiz. Historically~' thi"s' turning point is all' 
the more remarkable since we can nowhere observe any direct 
influence that Leibniz's fundamental thought might have exer­
cised on Rousseau. The epistemology which RQusseau wove into 
the ·Professions de foi du vicaire savoyard' frequently reminds 
~s line by line of Leibniz's Noveaux Essais--but it is known that 
this work was published only in the year 1165, from the manu­
s~ript in the rb~rary in -Hanover, three years after the appear­
ance of Emile. . : 
For Cassirer's purposes, the Noveaux Rssais might as ,'tvell have-been 
published much earlier, at least early enough that Rousseau could 
have copied it uline by line. tt 
Despite the criticism of Cassirer's' penchant for structure and 
affinity for schemata, he has had a profound influence on the general 
community of historians. His work in many areas was unique and he ­
qid consi,d~rab1e original research. lOB He has had some i~~_luenc~" on. 
subsequent historians, especially with some o~ the specifics of his 

io9
data. Even the abundance of criticisms of his works attests to 
I 
the seriousness with which he has been viewed as a historian. 
l07The ~estion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp .. 112-113. 
l08Diekmann 'couples 'praise with criticism -in, his review of The 

Philosophy of 'the Enlightenment; Peter Gay, in the introduction to-­

his translation of The Question of Jean-Jacques-Rousseau, sees the 

essay as ,"an aesthetic as ,well asintel.lectual achievement of "the 

',first order," one of gr.eat s~gnificance in" the hist9ry of :;'nte-r:preta~ 
tions of Rousseau. (p. 24, see pp. 21-30.) 
109See the notes 'to Peter Gayts" The "Enlightenment: An Interpreta­
~ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), vol. 2. 
I 
I 

i 
55 
But Cassirer used a paradigm charged with possibilities 'for 
fallacy. He accepted the idealist view that f1mindU and "matterU are 
identical, 'that' 'tlmindU operates:: according, to the' rules of ,logie, 'and 
, 110 
..-that l~gic, c~n 1>~,' ~l?p'lie,d' to ~he' h~~to~1 ,of, though,t. ..' He used the' 
analytic-synthetic idealist approach, the breakdown and recreation 
of a body of data. The history of thought--the history' 'of the tlmind"- ' . 
moved, from an analytical period to an ,organic one in' a never ending 
process, Cassirer believed. And at each juncture, at: each organic 
stage, there was a transitional figure to'bring everything·tog~her 
again: Nicholas of Cusa, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and others. 
Cassirer, in his response to the "crisis" situation, to the,plethora 
of F~agmented theori~s of man, to an ana~~tical period in' European ' 
thought, saw himself as a,new ~~ansitional figure. His paradigm_ 'Was 
a response to a "crisis" in'Kuhn's sense of the 'toJ'ord. But at· the same 
time, 't~ithin the framework of 'Cassirer' s scheme', it w~s intended to' 
provide the new synthesis in the development of the nmodern,mind. u 
'Cassirer's synthetic paradigm fulfills the criteria Hollinger 
names for "successful" works in the field. lll And he must be lauded 
for explaining his methodological position and consistently abiding, 
by it. But if the basic tenets of idealist ,p~ilos,ophy ar~ not ,accepted" 
his entire model 'fails as a viable paradigm' for hi'storical"research'and 
writing. Implicit in the criticisms of ,Price, Skinner, Foucault, and 
others is 'the recognition of the absurdity of these tenets. 'The pursuit 
llOOn the idealist approach to histo'ry, see Coates and White, pp. 

80-111. 

111 See above, p. 4• 
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of the history of the "mind," of the "knowledge of knowledge," can 
only lead to historical absurdities. 
.,' r 
---
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